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The UK Covid-19 policy response illustrates the problems arising where (1) a central 
government faces few countervailing pressures as in Westminster systems; (2) the design of 
intergovernmental relations mechanisms of coordination and conflict resolution fails to cope 
with the realities of asymmetric devolution; and (3) local government faces serious collective 
action problems in relation to a dominant central government. Firstly, the UK policy response 
shows how government ministers, given the absence of effective checks and balances, enjoy 
extensive powers over health services and the unchecked capacity to initiate major 
reorganisations. Secondly, the central policy response fuelled nationalism in Scotland and 
Wales, already under post-Brexit strains, but had less impact on Northern Ireland, and 
presented a political opportunity for English city-region mayors. Thirdly, the central response 
illustrates the UK central government’s continued search for greater control of central-local 




The UK has among the worst outcomes across the developed nations for Covid-19 deaths, 
cases and economic costs (Giles 2020). Public disapproval of the UK government’s handling 
of the crisis at the end of 2020 was the highest of 14 major countries, including the US (Pew 
2020). Although the furlough and business support schemes (administered by Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs) and the UK vaccination programme (the Oxford 
University/AstraZeneca vaccine development with NHS delivery) are notable successes. 
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Serious questions must arise over the UK government’s performance including over delayed 
lockdowns and restrictions, a late then failing test, track and trace system and the neglect of 
social care (Calvet and Arbuthnott 2021; Farrar and Ahuja 2021, Ham 2021).  
 
Our argument is that the external shock of the pandemic on the UK required a coherent and 
coordinated multi-level policy response, yet that response was characterised by widespread 
confusion, serious failures and blame games. Any explanation of this lack of coherence and 
coordination must consider the actions or inactions of those actors in crucial roles within the 
various governmental levels. Indeed questions of the responsibility, and even culpability, of 
ministers have been raised (e.g. Calvet and Arbuthnott 2021; Farrar and Ahuja 2021). 
However, our focus is less on individuals than on questions of how structural factors shaped 
the policy response within the intergovernmental context. In particular, the pandemic policy 
response was weakened by systemic organisational weaknesses within central government, 
unresolved issues in the UK’s asymmetrical inter-governmental relations (IGR) machinery 
and the serious imbalances in England between central and local government. In focussing on 
these three issues, we will also review the policy lessons which key actors are already 
drawing from events.  
 
Firstly, the implications for the pandemic policy response of powerful, functionally-organised 
Whitehall departments which have long contributed to control and coordination issues, 
despite periodic searches to join-up government (Diamond 2014, 80; Pollitt 2002). Such 
coordination  issues are often associated with the National Health Service (NHS), especially 
in relation to local government and particularly social care. Secondly, the resurgence of 
territorial politics – how the pandemic has contributed to the strains on UK intergovernmental 
relations (IGR), creating a legitimacy crisis for the Westminster government (for a recent 
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review McEwen et al, 2020) and raised the profiles of the new city-region mayors in 
England. Thirdly, how English local government at least initially was marginalised by central 
government, particularly through the outsourcing of test and trace, and had already been 
weakened by tighter central control,  significant cuts to local government finances since 2010 
and the loss of services by centrally-imposed outsourcing. In analysing these issues, we will 
draw on the wide range of secondary sources already available on the pandemic –government 
and parliamentary reports, think-tank and research reports, newspaper and media reports, and 
contemporaneous accounts. 
 
 The central management of coordination and control across the UKOur starting-point is 
that the UK, and England particularly, has retained a highly centralised system of government 
displaying symptoms of overload. Paradoxically, despite the stress on forging a liberal 
economy, since the 1980s the central state has extended its reach into innumerable spheres of 
social and economic life (Moran 2003). While central government’s reach has extended, the 
executive centre of government has faced limited steering capacities given the powerful, 
functionally-organised Whitehall departments. UK central government has been described as 
‘an accumulation of departments’ with a ‘polo mint’ hole in the centre (JCNSS 2020, para. 
91). The sheer scale of the multifaceted challenge of Covid-19 raised questions over the 
capacity of Number Ten and the Cabinet Office to establish clear priorities, while addressing 
the longer-term implications (JCNSS 2020).  
Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s governing style has involved a centralised Number Ten run 
through a cadre of political advisers, sceptical of large bureaucracies (Thomas and Clyne 
2021, 8). Insider-informed accounts (Calvet and Arbuthnott 2021; Farrar and Ahuja 2021; 
O’Donnell 2020) describe how the government failed to govern strategically, often ignored 
scientific evidence and advice and lurched from one crisis to another. Ministers in 
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Westminster systems, embedded in a ‘top-down governing culture’ (Matthews 2016, 6), are 
particularly susceptible to myths about the possibility of central control (Cairney 2020). Even 
so ministers engaged in blame deflection strategies, particularly as crises emerged in the 
National Health Service (NHS) under covid-19 pressure, and unleashed ‘blame games’ 
between the centre and localities.   
 
The tensions between the territorial and functional organisation of the NHSare crucial to 
understanding the government’s approach to control and co-ordination. The English NHS is a 
centralised bureaucracy with services delivered locally through primary care and hospital 
organisations but with growing contracting-out to private sector providers. Unlike local 
government, the NHS has a strong, unified presence within central government and relates to 
a single department, the Department of Health and Social Care. The Ministry of Housing, 
Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) has overall responsibility for local 
government but councils also have multiple points of contact in Whitehall, not least in 
relation to funding. The NHS had also been ringfenced from austerity cuts in an endeavour to 
prevent NHS waiting-lists becoming a pressing political issue. Significantly, social care (a 
local government responsibility) falls outside the ringfence, despite being closely intertwined 
with the NHS. Nonetheless, the NHS still faces financial pressures given high cost inflation 
in health, demographic change with an ageing population and the indirect impact of declining 
social care funding by LAs. As Covid-19 cases escalated, fears of possible NHS  service 
failures influenced decision-making. That the NHS did not implode in the first wave was at 
least partly because healthcare for infected elderly patients in hospitals was rationed, many 




The Conservatives’ 2012 NHS reorganisation (‘the Lansley reforms’), the latest of many 
NHS reorganisations, had major implications for the government’s pandemic response. This 
reorganisation involved a legally entrenched, policy-operations separation between health 
ministers and NHS England (NHSE), combined with a greatly expanded quasi-market in the 
NHS to reduce both political ‘micro-management’ and health costs (Timmins 2018, 96). 
Ministers would determine the policy direction, NHSE would oversee operations and NHS 
Improvement regulate the internal market. However, even before the crisis, Lansley’s 
successor as health secretary, Jeremy Hunt, rejected the policy-operations distinction and 
devoted considerable time to scrutinising operational decisions for political reasons, while 
NHSE itself often shaped NHS policy planning (Timmins 2020, 96-9). The reorganisation 
also required NHS managers and organisations to compete over delivering services with each 
other and the private sector. Both Hunt and the NHSE chief executive soon concluded that 
this compulsory commissioner-provider split discouraged the more pressing need for greater, 
local-level collaboration and integration of the various NHS organisations and with LA 
services (Timmins 2018, 102). 
   
The Lansley reforms also altered the health/local government relationship, shifting public 
health responsibilities back to local councils, although Public Health England (PHE) reported 
to the Department of Health. This particular reform was broadly welcomed across sectors as 
likely to improve LA-NHS co-ordination (Buck 2020, 13). Yet no coherent framework for 
central-local co-ordination was established. Instead public health experienced significant 
policy drift. The communicable disease staff were left in PHE, away from local public health 
directors, while the PHE regions focussed on PHE centrally rather than on local councils 
(Vize 2020). Austerity meant local public health budgets (now outside the NHS ring-fence) 
were cut by 25% between 2014-15 and 2019-20 (Vize 2020). During the pandemic, public 
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health directors experienced the consequences of the weak central-local, co-ordination 
framework, reporting delays arising from national-level confusion over roles together with 
the outsourced NHS Test and Trace system being managed with little reference to local 
conditions (Vize 2020, Reuters 2020).  
 
In early 2021, the government announced a new major, elaborate NHS reorganisation even as 
senior NHS managers were signalling yet another looming crisis as pandemic rates resurged 
(Nuffield Trust 2021). Ministers decided to perpetuate and formalise the tight political 
emergency control that they were exercising over the NHS, but apparently not 
acknowledging the inappropriateness of such tightened control as a long term strategy. 
Accordingly, the draft bill (July 2021) proposed greater powers for the health secretary to 
direct NHS England and intervene in local health matters. The ‘regional’ and ‘local’ bodies 
(the 200 plus clinical commissioning groups) presently overseeing the funding to NHS trusts 
and other providers, would be replaced by integrated care system boards (ICSB) in 42 
‘regions’, with LA representation limited to one board member regardless of the number of 
LAs in the ‘region’. Below the ICSB, integrated care partnerships (as joint LA and ICSB 
committees) would formulate integrated care strategies for smaller areas or ‘places’. 
Potentially LAs could lose their public health functions as the health secretary would acquire 
the power to instruct NHS England to take over local public health provision. Strikingly this 
power did not extend to social care despite how its inadequacies were revealed by the many 
care home deaths and its continuing, serious funding difficulties.  
 
Back in August 2020, the government had already announced PHE’s abolition and planned 
replacement by a new body, the National Institute for Health Protection. This abolition was 
widely seen, at least partly, to be about scapegoating PHE for a series of failings – the slow 
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introduction of test and trace, miscounting Covid-19 deaths, and initially not sharing data 
with directors of public health (Iacobucci 2020). PHE had stopped test and trace early in 
March 2020, despite a rising rate of infection, because of a shortage of staff and equipment 
(Briggs et al. 2020, 5), and was not working effectively with LAs (Calvet and Arbuthnott 
2021, 99; Reuters 2020, 3). However, PHE’s failings could also plausibly be seen as the 
result of government cuts to PHE funding and the reduction of its regions to four thus 
weakening links with LAs. Although PHE was an arm’s-length agency, questions must be 
posed as to whether health ministers could solely blame PHE for an inadequate contact 
tracing infrastructure.  
 
Finally, in a striking instance of a failure to plan and learn policy lessons prior to the crisis, 
government ministers had ignored the 2016 Project Cygnus simulation to test national 
preparedness for a flu pandemic. The Project Report had concluded: ‘The UK’s preparedness 
and response, in terms of its plans, policies and capabilities, is currently not sufficient to cope 
with the extreme demands of a severe pandemic that will have a nationwide impact across all 
sectors’ (PHE [2017] 2020, 6). The Report anticipated problems that subsequently emerged – 
a lack of central government readiness, the failure of Whitehall to engage effectively with 
local services, an inadequate PPE supply chain, and infection spread following a large scale 
discharge of hospital inpatients to care homes to free up beds. The Conservative government 
only partially engaged with the Report (JCNSS 2020, para 107, Dyer 2020). It was published 
four years later only under the threat of legal action (Dyer 2020), a government adviser 
plausibly suggested that most recommendations were ignored as the fear of a no-deal Brexit 
began ‘sucking all the blood out of pandemic planning’ (Calvet and Arbuthnott 2021, 89). 
 
 The resurgence of territorial politics and IGR 
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The three nations and UK IGR 
In the UK, like many Western European countries, sub-state national identities have 
strengthened in recent years. Indeed, Scotlandand Wales have acquired, and in the case of 
Northern Ireland, re-acquired,  extensive legal powers and control over public spending 
priorities. However, the UK government’s response to Covid-19 has created further UK IGR 
tensions over those powers on top of Brexit- driven tensions, particularly in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland where majorities had voted to remain in the EU. Post-Brexit the 
Westminster government’s retention of former EU responsibilities falling within devolved 
powers has exacerbated tensions. Despite some quasi-federal elements, UK devolution has 
not involved the multilateral, IGR institutions characteristic of established federal systems, 
notably Germany and Australia. The design of IGR institutions is fundamentally constrained 
by the asymmetric nature of UK devolution: firstly, the dual role of the Westminster 
government as both the UK and the English government; and secondly, the inevitable 
domination of IGR by England, the most populous and wealthy sub-state unit, representings 
86% of the UK population. The original devolution blueprints had sidestepped these 
fundamental difficulties (Laffin and Thomas 1999).  
 
Nonetheless, the UK now has three regional-level governments with some legitimacy and 
capacity to challenge the UK Government. Prior to the 2014 referendum, the Scottish threat 
of a vote for independence led the then Conservative-led Coalition (2010-2015) to agree 
concessions on additional powers. The Scots then rejected independence by 55%-45%. Wales 
has significantly less bargaining power, given the more limited support for independence. 
The Welsh government’s powers only recently moved to a ‘reserved powers’ model, tracking 
Scotland. The stronger, long term bargaining position of Scotland and Northern Ireland, 
compared to Wales, is also evident in their block spending allocations. Their expenditure on 
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devolved public services is around a third higher (29%) than comparable spending in 
England, and around a quarter higher (23%) than Wales. Even allowing for differences in 
need, the three nations enjoy higher levels of spending than England (Paun et al. 2021, 12). 
The Northern Ireland Assembly also acquired an additional £1 billion funding as the price of 
the Democratic Unionist Party’s (DUP) support for Teresa May’s minority Government 
(2016-19). This piecemeal, ad hoc approach to devolution with no clear rationale or 
overarching principle other than political expediency has been widely criticised (e.g. 
McEwen et al. 2020).  
 
On Covid-19, the three devolved governments have responsibility for their own health 
services. However, given their limited policy capacity, they have kept close to UK health and 
scientific advice channels. Their chief medical officers sit on the official-expert UK Scientific 
Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) which provides pandemic-related scientific advice 
(SGC Advisory Group, 2020). All three nations also have their own independent advisors and 
Covid-19 advisory groups. Nonetheless the sharing of UK SAGE advice acted as an IGR 
coordinating mechanism, especially over pandemic lockdowns and restrictions.  
 
Initially, the devolved governments tracked UK Government announcements, entering the 
first lockdown together on 23rd March 2020 (later than most European countries). The 
lockdown compelled employees to work from home (except for key workers); restaurants and 
pubs were closed; and social mixing was only permitted within households. Despite sharing 
SAGE advice, Scotland and Wales have been more cautious over restrictions. England and 
Northern Ireland ended the first lockdown on 3rd May, while Scotland and Wales waited until 
the 29th May and 1st June (Hale et al. 2021). Wales announced a 17 day ‘firebreak’ lockdown 
in autumn 2020 in line with SAGE advice. PM Johnson rejected this advice. He stuck to 
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regionally-focussed lockdowns in the north and midlands (as did Scotland), only then to 
reverse strategy by declaring a second English lockdown. Scotland and Wales appeared to 
diverge from England, but it was actually the Westminster government diverging from SAGE 
advice (Calvet and Arbuthnott 2021, 261-64). In Northern Ireland tensions arose over 
whether to follow the London or Dublin lead. The DUP and protestant community tended to 
argue for alignment with the rest of the UK, while the nationalist Sinn Fein looked to Ireland 
over containment measures, notably on school closures and testing (Evershed 2020). 
However, when the second wave emerged, Sinn Fein and the DUP moved closer on Covid-19 
measures.  
 
The political optics benefitted the Scottish and Welsh first ministers who appeared more 
competent than Johnson. In Scotland, 83% agreed that Scottish First Minister Nicola 
Sturgeon handled the crisis well, compared to only 30% for the PM (Ipsos Mori 2020). In 
reality, the early Scottish Covid-19 death rate was only marginally lower than England’s 
(Dickie 2020). During summer 2020, Sturgeon made announcements before the UK 
government, leaving Whitehall to reverse policy following the Scottish lead. Sturgeon’s 
decisive response contrasted with Johnson’s prevarications, boosting support for 
independence, at least temporarily. In Scotland, Sturgeon enjoyed an electoral uplift in the 
May 2021 elections, although more recent polls indicate support for independence may be 
declining. In Wales, First Minister Mark Drakeford’s Labour administration also increased its 
vote in the May elections. His sure-footed Covid-19 announcements considerably raised his 
profile. Meanwhile, lockdown differences between England and Scotland and Wales, created 




PM Johnson took a less conciliatory approach to the devolved nations than his two 
Conservative predecessors. During the second pandemic surge in Autumn 2020, Sturgeon 
and Drakeford complained they had not heard from the PM for six months (Norris and 
Brooks 2020). Ministers announced new English Covid-19 measures as if they applied 
automatically to the devolved nations, ignoring devolution. One former Number Ten staffer 
observed, ‘the centralised, even colonial mindset within Downing Street…Whitehall too 
often treats the first ministers of Scotland and Wales like regional mayors rather than the 
leaders of countries’ (quoted in Shrimsley 2020).  
 
The UK government further undermined relations with the devolved leaders with the 
announcement of a new UK-wide furlough, income support scheme beginning on 5th 
November 2020. The Scottish and Welsh governments joined the Northern city-region 
mayors in criticising Whitehall for only making such support available after the whole of 
England was affected. The perception was that UK policy was driven by English and 
particularly London-centric interests.  
 
Meanwhile, the UK’s formal IGR machinery proved largely irrelevant to pandemic 
management. The IGR machinery hinges on the Joint Ministerial Committee, involving 
ministers from the UK and the three nations, chaired by a UK minister. Its fundamental 
weakness is that it is purely consultative and not a decision-making body; it has no statutory 
powers. Not surprisingly, there is ‘a growing consensus that the current UK inter-
governmental relations mechanisms are not fit for purpose’ (PACAC 2018, para. 122). 
PACAC approvingly cited a Welsh Government report which referred to the JMC as a 
‘talking shop’ arguing that it should be able to reach ‘binding decisions’ where necessary 




In July 2019 the previous Conservative Government had appointed Lord Dunlop (a former 
Conservative Scottish Office minister) to review the ‘institutional arrangements’ of the 
Union. The Westminster Government took almost two years to respond (Dunlop 2021). 
Johnson’s Government rejected Dunlop’s recommendation for a new UK Intergovernmental 
Council, and a Secretary of State for Intergovernmental and Constitutional Affairs (Gove 
2021). Instead, the UK only agreed to modest changes including incorporating consensus 
decision-making into the IGR terms of reference, creating additional sub-forums for sectoral 
ministers’ meetings, and revising the dispute resolution process to allow for some 
independent mediation (Cabinet Office 2021). Wider reforms to entrench countervailing 
power for the devolved nations, such as in a reformed House of Lords, were not considered.  
 
More recently, Johnson has also broken with his predecessors’ conciliatory approach and 
switched to an assertive, unilateral unionism. In particular, he has sought to extend the 
government’s English ‘levelling-up’ agenda (see later) to the devolved nations, looking to 
work directly with their LAs and around the Scottish and Welsh governments (unlike the 
earlier ‘City deals’ which Whitehall had jointly developed with the devolved governments 
and LAs). Johnson appears to be trying to undermine Scottish nationalism and Wales Labour 
by replicating the strategy of using government grants to gain public support in England. The 
Scottish Government responded by attacking such UK unilateral attempts to undermine 
devolution (Lochhead 2021). Similarly, Drakeford condemned the UK Government’s A Plan 
for Wales (2021) as ‘a plan made for Wales – without Wales’ (Thomas 2021) and argued 
instead for a ‘union of solidarity’ and ‘entrenched devolution’ not reversible by the 




City-region mayors  
Under the Conservative-led coalition government, Conservative ministers sought to revive 
the politics of place in northern England by creating directly-elected, city-region mayoralties 
as part of a ‘Northern Powerhouse’ initiative (Lee 2017). This initiative also began a process 
of Conservative challenges to the Labour party in its traditional heartlands. The mayoralties 
and combined authorities are based on ‘deals’ – ‘contract-style agreements between central 
government and LAs to pursue agreed outcomes in discrete policy areas’ (Sandford 2017, 
72). These mayors have limited powers relating to economic development, and only the 
Greater Manchester mayor has significant responsibilities in health and social care. Instead 
the stress is on their role as spokespersons for their cities in attractingprivate sector 
investment and lobbying central government over economic development. To make an 
impact they depend on co-ordinating other agencies and using lobbying strategies (Roberts 
2020). Indeed, in the 2019 general election the Conservatives won an increased majority 
largely by winning many of these traditional Labour constituencies with their ‘Get Brexit 
Done’ slogan. Teesside and the West Midlands now have elected city-region Conservative 
mayors.  
 
The Covid-19 crisis has provided English city-region mayors with the need, and opportunity, 
to assert their authority. Andy Burnham, the Greater Manchester Mayor, became the de facto 
leader of the northern mayors. Burnham is a seasoned politician, having been health cabinet 
secretary in the last Labour Government. In early May 2020, Burnham warned that central 
government’s continuing failure to consult mayors outside London risked ‘fracturing national 
unity’. He pressed for the northern regions to be involved in any post-lockdown recovery 
programme (Burnham, 2020). In June, Burnham and Steve Rotheram, the Liverpool Region 
Mayor, criticised widening north-south inequalities and a perceived London bias in 
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coronavirus decision-making. Burnham cited PHE statistics showing that 24% of Covid-19 
deaths in Greater Manchester occurred after the May easing of the national lockdown, while 
the equivalent London figure was 9% (Charara 2020). Northern mayors stressed the need for 
improved test and trace self-isolation support payments, a more pressing issue in poorer 
northern areas than in the south. The government disagreed, but mayors like Burnham and 
Rotheram earned greater recognition as the national-level voices of their city-region, reflected 
in their increased electoral support in 2021.  
 
The Conservative ‘levelling-up’ agenda after 2019 has intensified the transactional, contract-
style shift in central-local relations involving high profile initiatives and greater reliance on 
competitive bidding for funding and high-profile central initiatives, excluding spending on 
mainstream services like public health or social care. The £4.8bn Levelling Up and £1bn 
Towns funds, announced in 2020 and 2021, disproportionately favoursConservative-held 
seats rather than areas of deprivation (Bounds and Smith 2020).. The government seems to be 
resorting to pork barrel politics, using funds for high profile projects and other promises, such 
as relocating civil service jobs (e.g. part of Treasury to Tees Valley Combined Authority with 
its Conservative mayor). The Conservative city-region mayors, Andy Street in the West 
Midlands and Ben Houchen in Tees Valley reaped the benefit in the May 2021 elections. Yet 
the new funds, with allocations spread over several years, seriously fail to compensate for 
almost ten years of real terms cuts in local government spending.  
 
The increasing centralisation of English local government  
Paradoxically, while the UK has become significantly devolved, England has become 
increasingly centralised. English LAs have limited scope for mobilising countervailing power 
vis-à-vis central government (de Widt and Laffin 2017). As Goldsmith and Page (2010, 1) 
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point out, LAs’ freedom of action is limited unless they have access to higher tiers of 
government through formal representation, corporate representation (through local 
government associations) and/or informal links through personal contacts. English councils 
have no constitutional protection or formal political representation in the UK upper house, 
unlike local government in France and the German Länder, nor equivalent political standing 
to that enjoyed by French mayors and Länder prime ministers. Moreover, corporately the 
English Local Government Association (LGA) faces collective action problems exacerbated 
by having to represent locally-diverse areas nationally, while the domination of party politics 
(relatively polarised compared with most European countries) often further compromises its 
promotion of local powers (De Widt and Laffin 2018). Consequently, successive 
Westminster governments have faced little effective resistance from English local 
government. The post-1980s dismantling of once integrated professional-bureaucratic, 
central-local channels, based on a stable framework of consultative norms and practices, has 
also limited local government influence within the centre (Laffin 2009). The central-local 
relationship is now increasingly characterised by tighter regulatory and financial controls 
over services and ad hoc central interventions.  
 
Local government has suffered much deeper cuts than central government overall. Between 
2010-11 and 2020-21, overall local government spending power fell by 26.3% in real terms 
(NAO 2021, 16). In particular, LA emergency planning expenditure fell 35% in real terms 
between 2009/10 and 2018/19 (Davies et al. 2020, 31). Consequently, LAs were poorly 
equipped initially to cover additional Covid-19 costs with poorer urban areas 
disproportionately affected. The 2011 closure of government regional offices had broken an 
important central-local link partly as regional level resilience teams were dismantled 
(Murphy 2014). The cuts have been deeper in more deprived areas and funding disparities 
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will exacerbate north-south divisions: ‘LAs serving more deprived communities could see 
particular increases in service needs and challenges if the coronavirus crisis hits individuals 
and families already suffering disadvantage harder, and these effects could be long lasting’ 
(Ogden and Phillips 2020, 3). 
 
LAs have been compelled to accept austerity. The constraints on their acting collectively, the 
limited availability of ways to mobilise countervailing power against the centre, and the 
central-local politics of blame allocation, have left LAs particularly vulnerable to centrally-
imposed austerity. Under the Thatcher government during the 1980s, many urban Labour 
authorities had resisted cuts. Central government retaliated by capping local rates, 
surcharging councillors and abolishing the metropolitan, city-region councils, including the 
Greater London Council. Meanwhile, ministers and the media stigmatised the Labour party 
by branding protesting Labour councils as ‘loony left.’ Labour councillors have been 
influenced by this experience and the Labour party centrally looks to dissuade their councils 
from taking on a Conservative central government with a large parliamentary majority.  
 
An early assessment of the Government’s Covid-19 performance noted that many 
interviewees across central and local government, ‘felt that the pandemic response showed a 
fundamental breakdown of the working relationship between central government in 
Westminster and local government across England’. Officials, including those in MHCLG, 
lacked understanding of LAs (Thomas and Clyne 2021, 10). Central decision-makers were 
detached from local institutions – mayors, LAs, public health teams – and crucially those at 
the front-line co-ordinating the Covid-19 response. One former official commented on ‘a 
disgraceful, patronising view of local government – that they are less capable, less 
experienced, more incompetent, and more shambolic than people in central government’ 
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(quoted in Thomas and Clyne 2021, 11). Although such attitudes and distrust between 
English central and local government are not new (Lowndes 1999). 
 
Nonetheless, a closer and more nuanced central-local relationship has developed between 
MHCLG and local authority finance chiefs (National Audit Office 2021). MHCLG had to 
build links with LAs to distribute the additional funds allocated to pandemic-related 
programmes, particularly payments to support self-isolation (Blythe 2021). The department 
and LAs established a monitoring system to anticipate difficulties and coordinate other 
departmental funding (NAO 2021). Tellingly, a senior MHCLG official noted that his 
department realised how little they actually knew about local government – the crisis ‘forced 
us to confront the question of what are national and what are local responsibilities.’ Some 
policy learning was now happening as the department was seeking a shared view of central-
local responsibilities examining “what has been done at the right level and what has not?” 
during the pandemic (Blythe 2021). 
 
The NAO (2021) also found that while MHCLG engaged more closely with local 
government, other departments’ engagement remained poor. Moreover, central government’s 
‘incremental funding’ of LAs hampered effective financial planning, alongside a proliferation 
of separate funding pots for which councils must invest time and effort to bid. The NAO 
(2021, 5) also questioned whether local government finance was sustainable on present 
trends. Many local authorities had planned their 2021-22 budgets assuming they would have 
to make additional cuts. Their continuing use of  already dwindling reserves was not a 
sustainable strategy. Consequently, the NAO concluded that the post-2022-23 financial 
uncertainty meant that councils cannot plan local service provision effectively. They 
recommended that MHCLG and Treasury should produce longer-term, not year by year, 
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financial plans for local government to enable LAs to innovate and adapt. To compound the 
problem, the government had previously shifted local government financial accountability to 
a focus overwhelmingly on financial conformance rather than policy-related, organizational 
performance (Ferry and Eckersley 2015). 
 
Central-local relations and outsourcing 
The pandemic response underlines the severe asymmetries inherent in English central-local 
relations, and the limits on English LAs’ discretion and effective access to the centre (Copus 
et al. 2017). Their discretion has been further circumscribed by the shift towards alternative 
service delivery chains designed to work around LAs, ‘governing through governance’ 
(Bache 2003). Conservative and Labour governments have transformed local service delivery 
in England. Some major service delivery chains have been outsourced – most notably in 
social housing, education, social care and leisure and cultural services – to extra-
governmental organisations in the private and voluntary sectors, deliberately removing them 
from local government control (Laffin 2009). Outsourcing has displaced the professional-
bureaucratic relationships that once underpinned service delivery, as illustrated by the public 
health profession (Roderick et al. 2020).  
 
The misnamed NHST&T is an example of such a new service delivery chain outside the 
NHS. Ministers created the new organisation, NHS Test and Trace (NHST&T) and appointed  
a private sector manager to lead it.. Dido Harding was the ex-chief executive of the TalkTalk 
mobile phone company, a Conservative member of the House of Lords, a McKinsey 
Consultancy alumna, former chair of the NHS Improvement Agency and married to a 
Conservative MP. Similarly, the NHST&T Executive Committee included just one public 
health expert (an epidemiologist) alongside one local government representative. The 
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management team and roles in related agencies were similarly given to those from the worlds 
of politics and consultancy rather than public service (West, 2020; Conn et al. 2020). The 
staffing of NHST&T reflected the trend for ministers to take an increasingly sceptical view of 
traditional professional and public administration knowledge and skills, and their preference 
for the skills involved in management consultancy and outsourcing (Crouch 2015).  
 
NHST&T was launched on 28th May 2020. LAs were not directly involved, local directors of 
public health were simply informed. This government-described ‘world-beating’ programme 
with a budget of £22 billion was expected to enable lockdown measures to be lifted by 
identifying and isolating infected individuals (Giles 2020). It broke with the British tradition 
of professional-bureaucratic links whereby the ‘system of communicable disease control has 
relied on close cooperation between local health services and authorities. General 
practitioners, NHS and public health laboratories, and local public health officers play key 
roles’ (Roderick et al. 2020, 369). The professional and local social capital of these actors 
was marginalised. Instead contact chasing was implicitly re-defined as just a ‘call centre’ 
function to which staff could be recruited and trained. Serco, a multi-national services 
company, won the main contract to operate the call centres. A Whitehall official raised the 
important issue of the strong market position of companies like Serco, ‘Serco are pretty much 
the only people who can stand up a work force in that time, and love them or hate them, it is 
about having the numbers’ (quoted in Mueller and Bradley 2020). Indeed, the NAO (2013) 
had previously warned of the dangers of the big-four service contractors ‘being too big to 
fail’. Serco then contracted out the work to 20 subcontractors and the contact tracers were 





The directors of public health became frustrated with NHST&T’s information management 
systems, finding out more from local media about infections (Reuters 2020, 10). Scotland and 
Wales withdrew from the UK system, establishing structures based on local directors of 
public health leading contact tracing, redeploying staff while establishing their own testing 
sites (Bounds and Neville 2020) and succeeded in contacting 80% of suspected cases (Welsh 
Government 2020, para 3). Public Health Scotland launched its National Contact Tracing 
Centre to train and employ staff directly working with Scottish NHS regional boards. In 
England, LAs had to negotiate agreements for data-sharing through Whitehall. The data only 
began to arrive weekly in late July 2020. Even then, LAs had to wait for the NHST&T to 
arrange testing (Briggs et al., 2020, 15). It was reported that Whitehall’s refusal to provide 
data, apparently for reasons of confidentiality, hindered efforts to contain virus outbreaks; 
and the information related to only hospital tests rather than the community or care homes 
(Wallis 2020).  
 
By September, SAGE (2020) concluded that NHST&T was having a ‘marginal impact’ on 
virus transmission given the low levels of public engagement, testing delays and poor rates of 
adherence to self-isolation. By October, a refocus of national contact tracing to be ‘local by 
default’, announced by Harding in early August, had not yet taken place. Almost all councils 
notified central government that they wished to deliver test and trace locally; many were 
already contact tracing, although other councils were waiting for Whitehall to respond to their 
additional funding requests (Calkin 2020). The cross-party Public Accounts Committee 
(2021, para 8) cited the SAGE Report (2020) that NHST&T had not made a ‘measureable 
difference’ to the spread of Covid-19 despite involving actual expenditure of £16 billion 




The test and trace contract was the first of many awarded to private companies. A highly 
critical NAO (2020) report found that most contracts for PPE and hospital supplies were not 
competitive. Companies with political connections were processed through a ‘high priority’ 
channel and were more likely to be successful than others.  
 
Social care is another example of where outsourcing has brought problems. Social care is 
managed locally and social care is funded by LAs on a means-tested basis, not by the 
nationally-funded NHS. As LAs are increasingly financially constrained and social care is 
usually their greatest expense, the care sector is seriously under-funded. As an under-funded 
sector with means-testing of adult clients (unlike the free NHS), it has long been widely 
recognised as requiring reform, but successive governments have postponed action. Early in 
the pandemic, to accommodate rising numbers of Covid-19 patients in hospitals, many 
elderly patients were transferred to care homes without being tested, spreading infections 
(Calvet and Arbuthnott, 261-64). Between March 2020 and April 2021, elderly care home 
excess deaths increased by 20% (27,179) and in domiciliary care by 62% (9,571) (Health 
Foundation 2021, 3). Care homes lacked proper PPE and the poorly paid workforce often 
acted as infection vectors. The financialisation of the sector has also involved increased 
ownership by private equity and private companies, focussed on property investment returns 
rather than health outcomes (Horton 2019).  
 
In the 1990s some commentators had initially welcomed the proliferation of organisations 
involved in outsourcing as evidence of a new ‘governance’ model whereby delivery networks 
were becoming increasingly ‘self-organising’ as central government was ‘hollowed-out’ (e.g. 
Rhodes 1997). Even the later, more nuanced, governance literature continues to create the 
impression that the central state’s role is weakening and argues that the service delivery 
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debate should focus on the role of increasingly pluralistic networks (e.g. Torfing and 
Sørensen 2014). We would question such a focus and point to the need for analytical 
frameworks which more closely reflect the political realities and power asymmetries of the 
central-local governance landscape. In particular, questions should be posed around how 
outsourcing typically downgrades traditional professional expertise (Crouch, 2014; Roderick 
et al. 2020), the impact of financialisation on local services (e.g. Horton 2019), the growing 
outsourcing reliance on large service companies with quasi-monopolistic position vis-à-vis 
government (NAO 2014), cronyism in contracting-out and making appointments (NAO 2020, 
Conn et al. 2020) and the implications for local political accountability.  
 
Conclusions 
The coordination problems  arising within the UK pandemic policy response reflect long-
standing issues within central government, UK IGR and English central-local relations. 
Firstly, an over-centralised, central government, with few countervailing constraints, makes 
policy failures more likely. The 2021 proposed NHS reorganisation, and the flawed 2012 
NHS reorganisation, illustrate how ministers can embark on major service reorganisations 
with a minimal degree of reflective policy learning or consultation (Moran 2003). The 2021 
NHS reorganisation draws on a narrative that the source of coordination failure arose from a 
deficit of ministerial control over NHSE and PHE nationally and locally. Strikingly, ministers 
began planning and implementing a major reorganisation while the pandemic was still raging, 
reflecting a ‘top-down governing culture’ (Matthews 2016, 6). As Chris Ham (2021) observes 
the reorganisation reflects ‘a preference for heroic leadership by the few rather than collective 
and distributed leadership by the many’. Similarly, Project Cygnus had flagged up most of 
the key issues around pandemic management, but government ministers failed to learn the 




Secondly, the UK IGR mechanisms of coordination and conflict resolution fail to cope with 
the realities of asymmetric devolution. The Westminster government’s response to the 
pandemic had a centrifugal effect on UK IGR relationships. The Scottish and Welsh political 
leaders have been strengthened by their handling of the crisis. But these leaders aspire to take 
their nations in what are divergent directions – Scotland towards independence, Wales 
towards membership of a more balanced UK ‘union of solidarity’. Meanwhile, Northern 
Ireland is holding together a fragile, traditional unionism while balancing inter-communal 
relationships. These divergent objectives, and the consequently, differing political 
engagement strategies with the UK limit the scope for a cross-nations coalition to reform UK 
IGR. Meanwhile, the present UK government’s unilateral unionism means that it is unlikely 
to make concessions in its domination of IGR. The outlook is for continued stalemate over 
IGR reform. 
 
Thirdly,  within Englandthe pandemic response has exposed the fissures in a dysfunctional 
central-local relationship. LAs are structurally disadvantaged as they face severe collective 
action problems and their access to sources of countervailing bargaining power is severely 
limited, even more so than for the devolved governments. LAs’ scope even to act as effective 
agents of the centre, let alone create local initiatives, is being further curtailed by continuing 
austerity, tighter policy and financial controls, the greater stress on electorally-driven rather 
than needs-based funding schemes, and central government resort to outsourced service 
delivery chains to work around LAs. The trend is likely to be for more pork –barrel politics, 





The pandemic, then, shows that the centre’s appetite for top-down control is undiminished. 
Assumptions about cooperatively-minded actors and the ease of pluralistic coordination, 
implied in the network governance central-local research agenda, distract from pressing 
issues. Rather the focus should be on questions relating to increasing government dependence 
on outsourced delivery chains and multi-national service companies, how  increasing 
financialisation can undermine social services, management consultants’s challenge to 
traditional professional knowledge and skills, the impact of continuing austerity impact and 
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